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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This matter arises from a dispute between an insured, plaintiff-appellant Lakeland True 
Value Hardware, LLC ("Lakeland"), and its insurer, defendant-appellee Hartford Fire Insurance 
Company ("Hartford"), regarding the amount owed under an insurance policy as the result of a 
roof collapse at the Lakeland hardware store in Rathdrum, Idaho on January 28, 2008. 
Prior to suit, Hartford made policy payments for Business Income and Business Personal 
Property based upon information provided to it; however, rather than provide additional 
information required under the policy, Lakeland filed suit for breach of contract and bad faith. 
During the course of litigation, Hartford was able to secure additional information and make 
additional policy payments which ultimately totaled $746,979.25. The District Court eliminated 
Lakeland's bad faith claim on summary jUdgment - a decision reiterated in multiple subsequent 
motions for reconsideration. 
Despite Hartford's payments and the District Court's rulings, Lakeland proceeded to 
trial, asserting that Hartford failed to pay an additional $19,052 in Business Income coverage 
based upon Hartford's determination of when Lakeland should have resumed operations. The 
jury returned a unanimous defense verdict. Lakeland now appeals, claiming many errors, both 
by the District Court and the jury in this matter. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
Lakeland initially filed this action on September 4, 2008 (R., 19-22) and filed an 
Amended Complaint on September 15,2008. (R., 23-25.) On August 31, 2009, Hartford served 
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a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment for $100,000, which was not accepted. (R., 2679-80; R., 2671, at 
~2.) 
Hartford filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on August 20, 2009 (R., 34-1528), and 
a hearing was held on November 4,2009. (Tr. I, II. 52: 17-53:7.) By order dated November 23, 
2009, the District Court dismissed Lakeland's bad faith claim but denied summary judgment 
"with respect to plaintiffs claim for breach of contract as relating to Hartford's determination of 
the dates of the 'Period of Restoration' at issue in this matter." (R., 1767-69.) Lakeland then 
moved for reconsideration of the summary judgment decision on December 16,2009 (R., 1774-
87), which the District Court denied after a hearing on January 13,2010. (Tr. III, II. 26:1-30:9; 
R. 4th Adden., 13-15 (April 16, 2010 Order).) At the same hearing, Lakeland conceded that its 
designation of two experts, Robert Underdown and Drew LucureII, was moot based upon such 
decision. (Tr. III, II. 33:14-16, & R., 1894-96.) 
On February 4,2010, Lakeland moved for reconsideration a second time (R., 1954-55 & 
2005-18), which the District Court again denied after a hearing on February 22,2010. (Tr. I, II. 
l36:19-137:2, & R., 2110-11 (Order).) At the same hearing, the District Court denied 
Lakeland's motion to amend its complaint to add a claim for punitive damages. (Tr. I, II. 137:2-
l37:25, & R., 2116-17.) In conjunction therewith, the District Court also struck the affidavit of 
Lakeland's untimely disclosed expert, Robert Underdown, submitted in support of Lakeland's 
motion. (Tr. I, II. l38:1-13, & R., 2114-15.) Thereafter, on March 8, 2010 the District Court 
ruled that Lakeland could not claim consequential damages and thereby limited the scope of 
testimony by Lakeland's accounting expert, Dan Harper, to testimony that "plaintiffs damages 
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in this action total no more than $19,052, which amount will be subject to cross-examination by 
defendant at the time oftrial." (R., 2183-2215, R., 2218-21, & Tr. I, II. 166:8-167:6.) 
Thereafter, on April 6, 2010, Lakeland filed yet another Motion for Reconsideration of 
the District Court's bad faith ruling, as well as the ruling on the scope of Lakeland's damages. 
(R.,2261-2270.) That Motion was denied. (R.,2319-33.) 
On May 25, 2010, trial in this matter commenced. (See generally, Tr. I, II. 243:1-
457:10.) On May 28, 2010, the jury rendered a unanimous defense verdict. (Tr. II, 948:21-
952:13 & R., 2621.) Judgment was entered on July 15,2010. (R., 2937-38.) Hartford moved 
for mandatory and discretionary costs. (R., 2623-2923.) Lakeland failed to file a timely 
opposition to the Motion for Costs, and, following a hearing (Tr. II, pp. 955-986), Hartford was 
awarded $15,256.08 in costs-by-right and $56,574.69 in discretionary costs. (R., 2939-40.) 
Lakeland filed its appeal on July 9, 2010 (R., 2934-36), and later filed its Amended 
Notice of Appeal on September 7, 2010. (R., 2944-52.) 
C. Concise Statement of the Facts 
1. The Policy. 
Lakeland was insured by Hartford under Business Spectrum Policy No. 83 SBF SX5295 
("Policy"), which included a Special Property Coverage form providing $370,000 in Business 
Personal Property coverage, and Business Income coverage. (R., 73-183, 185-86; Tr. Exh. 
1001-1003.) The Business Income coverage provides for up to 12 months of net income and 
continuing normal operating expenses when business operations are suspended. (R., 97; Tr. 
Exh. 1003, at H 405.) However, Business Income is limited to the "Period of Restoration," 
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which ends either when business is resumed elsewhere, or when "[t]he property at the 
"scheduled premises" should be repaired, rebuilt, or replaced with reasonable speed and similar 
quality(.]" (R., 111-12; Tr. Exh. 1003, at H 419-20.) The Policy allows for the reduction of 
Business Income loss "to the extent you can resume your 'operations', in whole or in part, by 
using damaged and undamaged property (including merchandise or stock) at the 'scheduled 
premises' or elsewhere," and specifically requires that the insured "resume all or part of your 
'operations' as quickly as possible." (R., 109; Tr. Exh. 1003, at H 417.) The Policy also 
contains a "Duties in the Event of Loss Or Damage" section, generally requiring an insured to: 
protect the covered property; provide "complete inventories of the damaged and undamaged 
property" (including "quantities, costs, values and amount of loss claimed"); allow inspection of 
property and records proving the loss; cooperate with the investigation; and, again, "[r]esume 
part or all of your 'operations' as quickly as possible." (R., 107; Tr. Exh. 1003, at H 415.) 
2. The roof collapse and claim reporting. 
On January 28, 2008, part of Lakeland's roof collapsed following a heavy snow. (R., 
188-90; Tr. Exh. 1005, at HOOOI-3.) The clean-up and storage of surviving stock and fixtures 
was conducted by Klein's Disaster Kleenup ("Klein's"). (R. Adden., 1-5; Tr. Exh. 1013.) Four 
large trailers were filled with surviving stock and fixtures and stored by Klein's. (R. Adden, 2.) 
Damaged stock and fixtures were disposed of. (Id) 
Lakeland made an insurance claim and received a $50,000 advance from Hartford for 
Business Personal Property on February 4, 2008 and an additional $50,000 for Business Income 
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on March 18,2008.1 (R.,67, 191,204-05; Tr. Exh. 1005, at H 4-5 & 18-19.) To analyze the 
Business Income data, Hartford retained a forensic accounting firm, MD&D. (R., 199-200; Tr. 
Exh. 1005, at H. 13-14.) MD&D calculated additional Business Income amounts, which were 
paid on May 23, 2008 and July 17, 2008. (R., 67, 228, 232, 293-94; Tr. Exh. 1004, at H 134-35 
& 1005, at H 42 & 46.) 
In order to make further policy payments, Hartford required additional information. 
Hartford requested on multiple occasions that Lakeland do the following: 1) provide inventory 
information in support of its Business Personal Property claim, which was not provided prior to 
the filing of Lakeland's suit; 2) take action on the salvage of surviving inventory; and 3) provide 
additional business income data, which again was not provided prior to the filing of Lakeland's 
suit. (R., 194,223,229,231-32,235,237-38,241,252,279-80, 288-89, 295-97, 302, and 304-
11; Tr. Exh. 1005, at H 8 (Feb. 8,2008), H 37 (July 8, 2008); H 43 (July 11, 2008); H 45-46 
(July 16,2008); H 49 (July 28,2008); H 51-52 (July 31, 2008); and H 55 & 66 (Aug. 5,2008); 
& Tr. Exh. 1004, at H 120 (Feb. 22,2008); H 121 (Mar. 3, 2008); H 129 (May 5, 2008); H 131-
32 (May 14,2008); H 135 (May 20,2008); H 136 (June 27, 2008); H 137-38 (July 8, 2008); H 
143 (July 11,2008); H 145-47 (July 16,2008); H 148-49 (July 28,2008); H 150 (July 30, 2008; 
H 151-52 (Aug. 28, 2008); and H 152 (July 28,2008 & Aug. 19,2008»). 
3. Suit filed and end-date of Business Income coverage. 
Rather than supply the requested claim information, Lakeland instead filed suit on 
I Lakeland's claim was handled by Hartford's third-party administrator, Sedgwick Claims 
Management Services ("Sedgwick"). 
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September 4,2008. (R., 19-22.) Lakeland's landlord provided Lakeland keys to the rebuilt store 
in early September, and a Certificate of Occupancy was issued on October 3, 2008. (Tr. I,ll. 
392:17-24.) Hartford determined Lakeland should have resumed operations (end-date for 
Period of Restoration) by November 1,2008. (Tr. II, II. 809:5-812:19; 818:25-823:5.) 
4. Additional information provided and payments made. 
On November 22, 2008, Lakeland's counsel finally produced a copy of the 874-page 
inventory list via email, which took Lakeland only approximately three to four hours to create. 
(R., 404-1278; Tr. I, II. 366:8-21; 369:3-4; 433:2-5.) After additional requests and coordination, 
an inspection of the stored inventory was made and additional inventory-related information 
was provided by Lakeland during the March-May 2009 timeframe. (R., 68, 330-58, & 1279-
1416). Additional documents related to the Business Income claim were forwarded to 
Hartford's counsel over the course of a number of months. (R., 1417-82.) Accordingly, 
Hartford made additional policy payments, totaling $746,979.25: $370,000 for Business 
Personal Property,2 $9,254.25 for Outdoor Signage, $7,396.00 for Computers and Media, 
$266,407.00 for Business Income, and $93,922 for Extended Business Income. (R., 2346.) 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Hartford does not identify any additional issues on appeal. 
2 By way of background, although not an issue at trial, based on information provided by 
Lakeland in January 2010, Hartford found that Lakeland failed to include claims for certain 
missing inventory, and a subsequent Business Personal Property payment of $43,074.95 was 
made on March 1,2010, thereby exhausting the $370,000 Business Personal Property limits. 
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III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Hartford does not seek fees on appeal in this matter, but requests an award of costs 
should it prevail, pursuant to LA.R. 40. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Lakeland's appeal does little more than ask this Court to second-guess the District Court 
and the jury and to ignore Lakeland's own decisions, such as its non-objections to jury 
instructions and special verdict form and its stipulations to strike its own expert, Mr. 
Underdown. As summarized below, each of Lakeland's purported grounds for reversal fails to 
establish any error by the jury or the District Court: 
• The jury verdict is correct - Lakeland asserts that the jury was "confused" as to the issue 
being litigated; however, substantial testimony and exhibits support the jury's decision 
that Hartford correctly determined October 31, 2008 as the Period of Restoration end-
date. A review of the testimony elicited by Lakeland also demonstrates that the 
overarching question was when Lakeland should have been able to resume operations. 
• No improper parol evidence was admitted - Lakeland states that improper parol 
evidence was admitted at trial. None of the three examples of testimony Lakeland point 
to offer any change to the terms of the contract, and, in one instance, the objected-to 
question was not even answered. Moreover, any error that may have occurred was 
subsumed by similar lines of questioning both by Hartford's counsel (without objection 
by Lakeland's counsel) and by Lakeland's counsel on cross-examination. 
• No jury instructions or special verdict questions are in error - Lakeland asserts that 
Instructions 2, 12, & 13, and Special Verdict questions Nos. 1 & 4 were improperly 
used. Lakeland's counsel did not object to the form of Instruction No.2 and Special 
Verdict question No.1, nor do such instructions contain any misstatement of law. 
Lakeland's objection to Instruction No. 12 seeks to improperly shift the burden of proof 
for Lakeland's breach of contract claim to Hartford. Finally, Lakeland failed to preserve 
the specific objection as to Special Verdict question No.4, and related Instruction No. 
13 and further, any error is harmless, as the jury did not reach the question of damages. 
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• Lakeland's bad faith claim was properly dismissed on summary judgment - Lakeland 
asserts the District Court erred in granting Hartford summary judgment on its bad faith 
claim. Lakeland failed to demonstrate there was a genuine issue of material fact on each 
of the elements of bad faith; in particular, that its claim was not fairly debatable and that 
it had any extracontractual damages. Further, any error in dismissing such claim was 
rendered harmless by the jury's finding in favor of Hartford. 
• The District Court correctly excluded consequential damages - Lakeland claims it is 
entitled to consequential damages if the matter is remanded; however, Lakeland cannot 
assert error in barring such claim because the jury never even reached the question of 
damages. Further, the District Court correctly ruled that the Policy excludes 
consequential damages. 
• Hartford was properly awarded its discretionary costs - Lakeland asserts the District 
Court erred in awarding Hartford discretionary costs. Lakeland failed to preserve such 
objection; however, the District Court correctly held that the case was extraordinary in 
nature, justifying an award of discretionary costs in favor of Hartford. 
• Lakeland's expert Underdown was properly excluded - Lakeland asserts that if the 
matter is remanded, the District Court should be directed to allow the testimony of 
Robert Underdown; however, the District Court correctly excluded Mr. Underdown, 
given Lakeland's late disclosure and the dismissal of the bad faith claim. Further, 
Lakeland's counsel acceded to the striking of Mr. Underdown's designation and 
affidavit, thereby failing to preserve an objection on appeal. Even if the matter were 
remanded, the District Court retains the discretion to evaluate whether Mr. Underdown 
may testify as an expert. 
• Lakeland is not entitled to fees on appeal - Lakeland also claims I. C. §41-1839 fees on 
appeal. As there are no grounds to reverse, Lakeland is not entitled to fees on appeal. 
Further, even were the matter reversed and remanded, the only relief Lakeland would be 
afforded would be a new trial. Lakeland cannot demonstrate the necessary factual 
components required for an award ofI.C. §41-1839 fees on this appeal. 
V. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Jury verdicts - "The jury's verdict on factual issues will generally not be disturbed on 
appeal." McKim v. Homer, 143 Idaho 568, 572, 149 P.3d 843 (2006). "'When reviewing a jury 
verdict on appeal the evidence adduced at trial is construed in a light most favorable to the party 
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who prevailed at triaL'" Id. "When it appears to this Court that the verdict is not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence or is against the clear weight of the evidence, then those 
issues become questions oflaw upon which this Court may review freely." Id. 
Summary judgment decisions - "The Supreme Court reviews a district court's decision 
on summary judgment using the same standard as that properly employed by the trial court 
when originally ruling on the motion." Black Diamond Alliance, LLC v. Kimball, 2010 WL 
1077889, *2 (Idaho, March 25, 201O)(citations omitted). "Summary judgment is appropriate 
only when 'the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.'" Hayward v. Jack's Pharm. Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 625, 115 P.3d 
713, 716 (2005). The Supreme Court '''exercises free review over the entire record that was 
before the district court in order to determine whether either party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter oflaw. '" Anderson v. Hollingsworth, 136 Idaho 800, 802, 41 P.3d 228, 230 (2001) 
Trial evidence objection - "By longstanding rule, a trial court has 'broad discretion in 
the admission of evidence at trial and its decision to admit such evidence will be reversed only 
when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion.'" Alderson v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 737, 
132 P.3d 1261, 1266 (Ct. App. 2006). "A litigant may not remain silent as to claimed error 
during a trial and later urge his objections thereto for the first time on appeal." Hoover v. 
Hunter, 249 P.3d 851,856,2011 WL 924040 (Idaho 2011). 
Jury Instructions - "This Court exercises free review over the correctness of jury 
instructions." Schmechle v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 185, 219 P.3d 1192, 1201 (2009). "We 
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'review jury instructions to determine whether the instructions, as a whole, fairly and adequately 
present the issues and state the law. '" Id "A requested jury instruction must be given when it 
is supported by any reasonable view of the evidence." Id "An instruction is not to be given if 
it is an erroneous statement of the law, not supported by the facts, or adequately covered by the 
other instructions." Id "Jury instructions are to be viewed as a whole in determining whether 
the jury was properly and adequately instructed on the applicable law." Id 
Award of discretionary costs - "The district court's decision under LR.C.P. 
54(d)(I)(D) is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Total Success Investments, 
LLC v. Ada County Highway Dist., 148 Idaho 688,694,227 P.3d 942, 948 (Ct. App. 2010). 
Expert testimony - "The admission of expert testimony is a matter committed to the 
discretion of the trial court, and we will not overturn the court's ruling absent an abuse of that 
discretion." Sirius LC v. Erickson, 150 Idaho 80, 244 P.3d 224,230-31 (2010). "Even if expert 
testimony is excluded, the determination will not be disturbed on appeal where the error is 
harmless." Id at 231. 
Abuse of discretion - "In determining whether the district court abused its discretion, 
this Court asks '(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with 
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial 
court reached its determination by an exercise of reason. '" Sirius LC, 244 P.3d at 231. 
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VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The verdict is supported by substantial evidence presented at trial. 
Lakeland attempts to dismiss the jury's verdict in a single page of its brief by 
pronouncing that "[t]here is no evidence in the record that Lakeland could have replaced the 
property at the store with reasonable speed, similar property on or before October 31, 2008" and 
concludes the jury must have been "confused" by the definition of the Period of Restoration. 
(Appellant's Brief, at 7.) The fatal flaw in Lakeland's argument is that the record is replete with 
testimonial and documentary evidence to support the verdict. 
In rejecting Lakeland's claims, the jury unanimously answered "Yes" to the first 
question on the Special Verdict Form - "Did Hartford correctly determine the end date of the 
period of restoration?" (R., Vol. 7,2621).3 The trial record amply demonstrates this decision 
rests upon substantial evidence. As an initial matter, the policy provides that the "Period of 
Restoration" "[e]nds on the date when: (1) The property at the "scheduled premises" should be 
repaired, rebuilt, or replaced with reasonable speed and similar quality[.]" (Tr. Exh. 1003, at H 
420.) The policy further requires the insured to "[r]esume part or all of your 'operations' as 
quickly as possible;" otherwise, the Business Income loss will be reduced "to the extent you can 
resume your 'operations,' in whole or in part, by using damaged and undamaged property[.]" 
(R., 107; Tr. Exh. 1003, at H 415 & 417.) Conceding at trial the interplay between these 
various policy provisions, from opening statement through closing argument, Lakeland argued 
3 Lakeland did not object to this question during the trial, thereby waiving its right to object to 
the submission of this Special Verdict question to the jury. (Tr. II, 11. 944:25-945: 11). 
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that the issue before the jury was whether Lakeland was able to have resumed its operations as 
of November 1,2008. Specifically, as Mr. Bistline stated in his opening statement: 
MR. BISTLINE: ... Now, the long and the short of it, what you're being asked to 
decide, uh, is a simple little question. They're taking the position that the store 
should've been opened at the end of October 2008, and we're taking the position 
that it couldn't possibly have been open in October of 2008 because they did not 
timely fund this claim. 
(Tr. I, ll. 337:21-338:38)(emphasis added).4 
Indeed, the jury had ample evidence to find that Hartford correctly determined that 
Lakeland could have reopened by October 31, 2008, and, thus, its verdict that "Hartford 
correctly determine[d] the end date of the period of restoration" was correct. The 'substantial 
and competent' evidence included not only the areas oftestimony offered above, but also: 
• Mike Fritz - Mr. Fritz, one of Lakeland's co-owners, testified that: Lakeland had an 
obligation to resume operations as soon as possible (Tr. I, II. 388:24-389:1; 389:18-21); 
the store could have been reopened with salvageable and undamaged inventory (389:2-
6); inventory was stored in trailers, but that he did not coordinate it being moved and 
counted (393:8-394:13); he had not provided a list of damaged goods prior to October 
31 st, 2008 (403 :2-5); he had not provided documentation to Hartford to pay for the 
fixtures by October 31, 2008 (406:21-24); he did not provide the full inventory report 
until November 2008, which took only three to four hours to create (406:25-407:4); he 
did not provide the same documentation that he had previously provided on an earlier 
claim (403:11-405:2, & Tr. Exhs. 1126 &1127); Lakeland was provided keys to the 
4 Nor did Lakeland object to the summary of the parties' claims. (305:22-306:8; 312:1-10.) 
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store in early September, and a Certificate of Occupancy was issued on October 3,2008 
(392:17-24); he was paying personal bills from the insurance proceeds, and his 
deposition testimony that use of the money for non-business expenses was not 
appropriate (422:24-423:1; 423:25-425:7); he was in Las Vegas for a week in May 2008 
when he had access to the stored inventory (443:25-444:6); and his deposition testimony 
that if Lakeland's employees weren't being paid, the Fritzes, too, should not have been 
paid (447:16-21). 
• Michelle Reynolds (Sedgwick) - Ms. Reynolds' video deposition was presented by 
Lakeland in its case-in-chief. Ms. Reynolds was a claims supervisor at Sedgwick. 
(Court Exh. 2, II. 5:9-14.) Ms. Reynolds offered testimony that: neither the Fritzes 
individually nor Just Ask Rentals were other insureds under the Policy (51: 11-17); the 
particular considerations in determining the end date of the Period of Restoration 
included the issuance of the Certificate of Occupancy and additional time to restock 
(55:2-56:7); the requests for inventory data were appropriate (57:7-62:21); Hartford's 
efforts to physically inventory the stock (62:22-64:25); Hartford made Policy payment 
advances to assist Lakeland to address immediate expenses and "get the insured going," 
but that additional advances cannot be made absent documentation (67:9-69:10); she had 
no issues with Ms. Kale's handling of the file (69:20-70:3; 86:11-14); and Lakeland's 
lack of diligence in providing documentation (70:4-73:14). 
• Brian AIm (Klein's) - Mr. AIm, also called by Lakeland in its case-in-chief, is an 
estimator for Klein's (Tr., I, II. 478:15-17), which handled the destroyed and salvaged 
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inventory post-collapse. Mr. AIm offered testimony that: Mr. Fritz removed computer 
equipment after the collapse (487:8-19); no lists of inventory were created by Lakeland 
personnel during the removal and storage of stock (489: 17-490:20); when the inventory 
was eventually removed for counting, it was still done so with an outstanding storage 
bill to Klein's (492:25-493:20); and that Lakeland employees were doing "nothing 
really" and "must observing" while the inventory was being removed for storage 
(494:6-21). 
• Julia Kale (Sedwick) - Ms. Kale's video deposition was presented by Lakeland in its 
case-in-chief. Ms. Kale was previously employed by Sedgwick, and initially handled 
Lakeland's claim. (Court Exh. 4, II. 7:15-10:13.) Ms. Kale testified that: the Fritzes 
were not insured under the Policy (122:7-9); that advances were not required under the 
Policy, but were made to initially assist Lakeland with its loss (125:1-19); Lakeland's 
failure to provide documentation of how the advance was spent (125:20-127:8); her 
multiple unfulfilled requests for Lakeland's inventory data (127:17-130:12; 136:8-138:4; 
145:12-146:16; 147:13-148:25; 152:18-22; 156:19-157:6; 158:7-159:4; 200:20-201:8); 
Mr. Bonanno's unfulfilled requests for Lakeland's inventory data (130:13-136:7); 
Sedgwick's retained salvage firm's unfilled requests for Lakeland's inventory data 
(159:5-161:13; 162:6-19); the lack of explanation from Lakeland as to why it had access 
to inventory but did not count it (163:12-166:12); MD&D's difficulties in securing 
Business Income documentation (176:6-20; 185:18-186:8; 189:22-191:12); payment of 
the Business Income claim once documentation was received (180:23-182:7;184:19-
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185:6); and needed payroll information and Lakeland's lack thereof (46:11-17; 50:24-
51:9; 74:5-18). 
• Steve Bonanno (GAB Robins) - Mr. Bonanno was an independent adjuster utilized by 
Sedgwick following the roof collapse. (Tr. II, 11. 513:19-20; 514:9-12.) He testified 
that: Klein's and Mr. Fritz were to generate an inventory of items being removed and 
stored (519:7-520:22); he never received a list of damaged, undamaged, or salvageable 
items, nor invoices, from Mr. Fritz or Mr. Aim (525: 12-14; 528:23-25); Mr. Fritz had 
provided appropriate documentation on a prior claim (530:15-531:14); he requested 
particular documentation of Mr. Fritz (553:11-554:19); and inventory summaries 
without value and quantities would not be appropriate information (555:23-557:4). 
• Amy Kohler (MD&D) - Ms. Kohler, also called by Lakeland in its case-in-chief, was an 
auditor involved in the evaluation of Lakeland's Business Income claim. (Tr. II, 11. 
562: 19-563 :5.) Ms. Kohler offered testimony that: the documentation requested at the 
outset of the claim was typical (642:6-13); Mr. Glenister did not object to additional 
document requests (653:3-7); the claim became contentious upon involvement by 
Lakeland's second counsel (600:22-601: 16); lack of timely and complete response to 
request for additional payroll and other data (661: 18-665:20; 667:6-668: 15); missing 
data, including payroll, rental, sales, bank statement, and monthly profit and loss 
information (669: 1 0-670:4); the inability to calculate payroll based on information that 
employees may have potentially left employment (680:15-682:12; 691:14-692:5). 
• Dan Harper (Lakeland's expert) - Mr. Harper's testimony that: he had billed 
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approximately $54,000 for his work for Lakeland by early March 2010 (Tr. II, 11. 
769:12-770:9); he had never worked for an insurance company (725:16-19); he had 
never owned nor operated a hardware store (747:22-748:2); he would accept that 
Lakeland was able to reopen without new inventory and new fixtures (772:2-773:5); he 
was not rendering opinions on policy interpretation, Lakeland's obligations under the 
policies, and whether or not Lakeland complied with the policy, including whether 
documentation was timely provided by Lakeland (775:25-776:14; 796:3-9); and that 
Hartford had paid $266,407 in Business Income, and Lakeland claimed an additional 
$19,052 at trial (781: 1-782:4). 
• Melanie Copley (Sedwick) - Ms. Copley was one of the Sedgwick adjusters on the 
claim (Tr. II, 11. 803:5-8; 805: 12-806:22). Ms. Copley testified that: the determination of 
when Lakeland could have resumed operations involved consideration of factors such as 
when they received keys, how long it would take to order stock, and additional time for 
benefit of the doubt (811:20-812:25; 814:16-815:13; 819:24-820:7; 822:9-823:5); the 
Policy does not require advances, but instead may be done as a courtesy (815: 14-
816:16); the Policy provides a 120-day Extended Business Income coverage after the 
store reopens, which was paid in full (816:21-817: 10); the date Lakeland could have 
resumed some of its operations was October 31, 2008 (818:21-819: 17; 827: 14-829:9; 
830: 1-21; 859:3-24)); the language of the Policy provides that property "should" be 
repaired, rebuilt or replaced, not "had to be" (821: 13-18); she was aware of inventory 
stored in trailers (820:24-821 :5); had Lakeland presented the inventory claim, it would 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF - 16 
have been paid sooner (833:25-834:3; 834:24-835:7); Lakeland did not present the 
inventory information requested prior to October 31, 2008 or allow the inventory to be 
counted (835:19-836:14; 836:21-837:2; 837:7-842:7); had the inventory process 
commenced immediately after the loss, it would have been funded in May 2008 (853:10-
854:12); and that once sufficient information was received, it was analyzed and paid 
(864:7-14). 
Further, the jury had before it dozens of exhibits reflecting Hartford's appropriate handling 
of the claim and Lakeland's failure to provide information in support of its claim, which 
included: Hartford's claim notes detailing Hartford's efforts to gather information from 
Lakeland on its claim (Tr. Exhs. 1003, 1004, & 1005); GAB Robins' notes, photographs and 
reports detailing Mr. Bonanno's efforts to gather information from Lakeland (Tr. Exhs. 1007, 
1008, 1014, & 1026A); letters and emails from MD&D requesting and re-requesting Lakeland's 
Business Income documentation, and responses thereto (Tr. Exhs. 1018, 1030, 1032, 1035, 
1051, 1054, 1056, 1057, 1061, 1063, 1064, 1067, 1068, 1069, 1070, 1079, & 1080); documents 
reflecting that signage and fixture quotes were not even gathered by Lakeland until 2009, after 
suit had been filed (Tr. Exhs. 1101 & 1104); Lakeland's checkbook and register and bank 
statements showing how Lakeland spent monies during the claim period (Tr. Exhs. 1128 & 
1129); and a copy of the Policy and the Special Property subpart (Tr. Exhs. 1001 & 1003). 
Lakeland does not point to any exhibit offered by it but not admitted, nor any exhibit it objected 
to. Lakeland's failure to object to exhibits admitted at trial regarding Hartford's Business 
Income determination and the bases therefore (and to testimony by the various witnesses 
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regarding the same) allows such evidence to support the verdict of the jury. In re Bowen, 95 
Idaho 334, 337, 508 P.2d 1240, 1243 (1973)('''Evidence introduced without objection stands as 
evidence in the case for all purposes and if sufficiently probative may support a finding. "'). 
In addition, Lakeland itself even elicited copious evidence at trial establishing that 
Lakeland was unable to reopen as of November 1,2008: 
• Mike Fritz - Mr. Fritz's testimony that: Hartford's request for an inventory list (Tr. I, II. 
362:21-364:15); access to the damaged and undamaged stock and fixtures stored in 
trailers by Klein's (370:12-372:16; 432:3-33:19); Lakeland's reopening in August 2009 
using salvaged inventory (375:8-22; 442:24-443:6); how initial advances were used 
(381:17-382:5); Lakeland's lack of payment of payroll (383:11-384:13; 437:12-15); and 
the Fritzes' personal use of the insurance proceeds (382:2-5; 440:2-441:9). 
• Michelle Reynolds (Sedgwick) - Ms. Reynolds was questioned on topic areas such as: 
needed documentation on inventory claims (Court Exh. 2, II. 5:9-14; 16: 11-19: 11; 
77: 19-81: 11); Hartford's patience in requesting documentation from Lakeland (24:23-
25:15); and timing of payments based upon receipt of documentation (33:6-23; 34:10-
13; 35:1-8). 
• Brian AIm (Klein's) - Questioning of Mr. AIm focused on inventory counting and 
storage, and Mr. AIm was asked about whether he was directed to sort salvageable from 
damaged inventory prior to storage (Tr. I, 11. 482:21-483 :7), the status of payment of the 
Klein's bill, including storage charges (483 :21-25; 484:22-486: 17), and the activity of 
Lakeland employees post-collapse in counting the inventory (494:6-21). 
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• Julia Kale (Sedgwick) - Ms. Kale was questioned in regards to: requests for Lakeland's 
inventory data (19:10-21:17; 22:1-25:13; 199:16-200:1; 200:20-201:18; 202:19-203:24) 
lack of requested inventory and financial documents from Lakeland (28:17-36:25; 90:3-
92:2; 104:9-105:4; 194:14-195:18; 210:8-211:22); requests for payroll information 
(38:10-40:1; 40:11-41:3; 42:10-45:25; 67:21-69:5; 72:23-73:14); and attempts to move 
and count the inventory (83:7-89:8; 196:19-197:20). 
• Amy Kohler (MD&D) - On direct by Lakeland's counsel, Ms. Kohler testified as to; the 
initial document requests and information provided by Lakeland (Tr. II, 11. 565:15-
568:8); the calculation methodology utilized in calculating the monthly Business Income 
amounts (Tr. II, 11. 569:12-578:22; 593:11-595:6; 610:18-612:22; 617:21-619:23); 
requests for payroll data and missing documentation (579:7-583: 13; 586:17-588:17; 
589:18-591:11; 595:7-596:12; 602:18-605:10; 607:2-609:3; 678:3-18; 686:13-687:19; 
688:7-690:20); the failure of Lakeland and its representatives to provide requested 
information, and requests by MD&D for such information (599:4-602:17;605:11-606:4; 
613:19-614:2; 620:25-625:17; 629:4-12; 679:4-684-4); her understanding of Lakeland's 
ability to reopen by a certain date (614:3-616: 1; 684:20-685: 14). 
• Dan Harper (Lakeland's expert) - Mr. Harper's testimony addressed a number of claim 
payment areas, including: payroll calculation and funding (Tr. II, 11. 736: 1 :739: 14); 
Hartford's payment timing and 'accumulated loss' calculation (754:2-20; 757:2-758:3); 
the Fritzes' use of insurance monies for personal purposes (758:9-24); the calculation of 
True Value debt as an inventory payment (761:19-762:3; 762:12-19); and Lakeland's 
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lack of ordered fixtures, re-stocking time, and monies available to purchase inventory as 
would related to "what was required to get this store open." (767:7-769:5.) 
• Steve Bonanno (GAB Robins) - On cross-examination, Lakeland elicited testimony 
relating to his initial assessment of the inventory component of the claim, including: the 
information provided by Mr. Fritz in a prior claim (Tr. II, 11. 531 :21-532:9); the intended 
creation of lists prior to storage to organize inventory into categories based upon degree 
of damage (11. 533:2-536:14; 558:11-559:22); his instruction to Lakeland to provide 
information regarding the claim promptly (540:25-542:5); Lakeland's failure to provide 
information (544:15-545:7); and Lakeland's discussion of reopening at a different 
location (545:8-548: 17). 
• Melanie Copley (Sedgwick) - Ms. Copley was cross-examined by Lakeland's counsel, 
who inquired as to her evaluation and handling of the claim. Critically, Lakeland's 
counsel specifically questioned Ms. Copley about when Lakeland could have resumed 
operations: 
Q. Okay. And what date could they have resumed some of their operations? 
A. I believe the date that they could've resumed some of their operations would 
have been October 31 st of2008. 
(818:25-819:4; accord 857: 18-859:24 (questioning and testimony regarding Resumption 
of Operations provision of Policy).) Lakeland's counsel also elicited testimony from 
Ms. Copley regarding the Period of Restoration language's use of the word "should": 
Q. Doesn't the period of restoration involve a determination of property of similar 
quality? Isn't that right in the language? 
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A. It says should be repaired, rebuilt or replaced. It doesn't say it had to be. It says 
should be, and that's what we looked at, should be. 
(821:13-18.) Lakeland's cross of Ms. Copley elicited additional testimony regarding, 
for example: factors considered in establishing the appropriate date the store should have 
opened (822:9-24; 827:7-829:9; 830:1-14; 832:7-833:14); Lakeland's failure to provide 
information in support of its claim (833:25-834:3; 834:24-837:20; 865:21-866:5); the 
inability to inventory the items stored in the trailers due to lack of information and 
Lakeland's own failure to inventory the stored items (839:12-844:7; 847:16-849:19; 
854:22-857:5); and Lakeland's ability to reopen as a True Value store (860:21-862:2). 
Tellingly, Lakeland's single cite to the record (citing R., 38-39) is not even a citation to trial 
testimony, but rather to Hartford's recitation of Policy provisions in its statement of undisputed 
facts on summary judgment. Lakeland itself framed the issue as a question of ability to 
reopen/resume operations via the testimony it elicited, and cannot now attempt to divorce a 
single line of the Policy from a) the word "should" in such language, and 2) the Policy language 
which limits Business Income based on the insured's ability to reopen.5 
Thus, the jury was provided overwhelming evidence as to the bases for Hartford's 
determination of the October 31, 2008 end-date for the period of restoration, and that Lakeland 
should have been able, and had a duty, to resume operations by that time. Accordingly, the trial 
5 Lakeland's counsel even argued at closing: "It's just the way things went, and they could not 
have been opened by October 31 st, 200 1 [sic] ... You know that they couldn't have been open. 
You know that that is not anybody's fault. They were all acting reasonably. It's just is the way 
it went down, and so I would ask, ladies and gentlemen, that you find that, no, October 31 st was 
not the proper date to calculate for the period ofrestoration[.]" (887:23-25; 898:25-899:5.) 
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record is clear that the jury verdict is supported by substantial and competent evidence, and is 
not otherwise against the clear weight of evidence. As such, the jury verdict should be affirmed. 
B. No improper parol evidence was presented to the jUry. 
Despite Lakeland's consistent focus throughout the trial on whether it could have 
resumed its operations as of November 1, 2008 (Tr. I, ll. 305 :22-306:8, 312: 1-4 & 7-10, & 
337:21-338:38; Tr. II, II. 887:23-25 & 898:25-899:5; and discussion at Section VLA, supra), 
Lakeland contends that three questions allowed by the District Court during the trial elicited 
inadmissible parole evidence regarding resumption of Lakeland's operations. A reading of the 
questions and testimony at issue demonstrates that none constitutes parol evidence and that they 
addressed the issues properly before the jury. 
Lakeland first objects to this question of Ms. Copley on direct: 
Q. Related to the period of restoration which is why we're all here today, who 
made that decision at Sedgwick regarding the fact that Lakeland should have 
been able to resume some of its operations by November 1 st of 2008? 
MR. BISTLINE: Objection, Your Honor. The Period of Restoration does not 
state that Lakeland had to be able to resume some of its operations by 2008. It 
says that it has to resume - has to repair or replace the property with a similar 
quality with reasonable speed. That has nothing to do with resumption of 
operations. 
(Tr. II, II. 805: 12-23.) Notably, the question posed only calls for an answer as to "who made 
that decision that Lakeland should have been able to resume some of its operations by 
November 1st of2008," to which Ms. Copley responded, "I did." (806:22.) Thus, Ms. Copley's 
testimony offers no change to the terms of the Policy at issue, but only identifies who made the 
determination that Lakeland should have resumed operations by November 1 st, 2008. 
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Second, Lakeland objects to the following question, also asked of Ms. Copley: 
Q. And are you able to do that for the jury with respect to the decision that you 
made that November 1,2008, was when Lakeland should've resumed some of its 
operations? 
MR. BISTLINE: Your Honor, I'm again gomg to object. The Period of 
Restoration does not say some of the operations. It doesn't say that. She's 
testifYing about a period of restoration standard that is clearly at odds with the 
unambiguous language of a contract. That is parol evidence, and it's complete at 
odds with what's going on here. She can't do this. 
(Tr. II, 809:5-15.) This question was never answered by the witness; instead, Hartford's 
counsel posed a new question which was not objected to by Lakeland's counsel. (811: 18-
812:19.) Thus, no testimony offering parol evidence was elicited by the question at issue. 
Third, Lakeland's counsel objected to the following testimony by Ms. Copley: 
Q. Sure. Why wouldn't you be considering Lakeland's financial condition in 
making this financial determination of when Lakeland should have been able to 
resume some of its operations? 
A. Because the policy specifically says you look at the time from when the loss 
occurred or when the collapse occurred until they could resume part of the 
operations. It doesn't say ... 
MR. BISTLINE: Objection. Parol evidence, Your Honor. This is varying the 
direct terms of the policy. That's not what the period of restoration says. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
(813:14-25.) Nothing posed in either the question or testimony attempts to change the "Period 
of Restoration" definition; rather, they only go to the question of how Ms. Copley evaluated 
Lakeland's ability to resume operations. Ms. Copley was then asked four additional questions 
regarding what was considered in determining whether Lakeland should have resumed 
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operations, all without objection by Lakeland's counsel. (814:8-815:13); see Smith v. Smith, 95 
Idaho 477, 482, 511 P.2d 294, 298 (1973)("When a party fails to object to secondary evidence 
of a document, such secondary evidence is deemed competent.") Furthermore, through its own 
questioning on cross examination, Lakeland's counsel asked questions directly addressing 
Hartford's evaluation of whether Lakeland should have been able to reopen by November 1, 
2008 and the Period of Restoration definition. (822:9-823:23,827:14-830:21.) 
Thus, Lakeland fails to demonstrate that any improper parol evidence was admitted. 
C. No error lies in the jury instructions and verdict form presented to the jury. 
1. There is no error in Instruction No.2 or the Special Verdict form. 
a. Lakeland made no objection to Instruction No.2, and there is otherwise 
no error in the giving of Instruction No 2. 
Lakeland contends that Jury Instruction No.2 was "not consistent with the facts of the 
case." (Appellant's Brief at 11.) Lakeland fails to cite to where it raised any objection thereto. 
LR.C.P. 51(b) provides, in part: "No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to 
give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, 
stating distinctly the instruction to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection." 
accord Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 776,203 P.3d 702,706 (2009). 
Instruction No.2, summarizing the parties' claims, was read to the jury on the first day 
of trial. (Tr. I,ll. 311 :7-312: 17.) Prior to reading it, the Court made the following inquiry: 
THE COURT: ... At the end of the trial I will have a packet of all the jury 
instructions that are given for each one of you, but at this point in time I simply 
need to read to you the initial set of four instructions, and any objections to 
instructions one through four, Mr. Bistline? 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF - 24 
MR. BISTLINE: No, Your Honor. 
(306:2-306:8)( emphases added). In none of the subsequent jury instruction and special verdict 
conferences did Lakeland's counsel object to Instruction No.2, as required by LR.C.P. 51(b).6 
(Tr. I, 11. 459:2-475:20; Tr. II, 11. 507:2-512:4; 704:2-720:16; 926:5-934:16; 936:8-945:18.) 
Accordingly, Lakeland has waived any right to raise an objection to Instruction No.2 on appeal. 
Moreover, there is no misstatement in Instruction No.2. The summary provided by the 
District Court - that "Hartford asserts that Lakeland should have been able to resume some of 
its operations following the 9-month Business Income period" - is later in Lakeland's counsel's 
own opening statement: 
MR. BISTLINE: ... Now, the long and the short of it, what you're being asked to 
decide, uh, is a simple little question. They're taking the position that the store 
should've been opened at the end of October 2008, and we're taking the position 
that it couldn't possibly have been open in October of 2008 because they did not 
timely fund this claim. 
(Tr. I, 11. 337:21-338:38)(emphasis added).7 As such, the appropriateness of the District 
Court's instruction is more than amply borne out by Lakeland's own summary of the claims. 
For these reasons, no error lies in the District Court's giving ofInstruction No.2. 
6 Nor do Plaintiffs Objections to Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions (R. 3rd Adden., 44-62) 
state a written objection to Instruction No.2 as given by the District Court to the jury. 
7 While Lakeland asserts that Instruction No.2 incorrectly summarizes Hartford's claim, it 
makes no objection to the summary of Lakeland's claim (R. 3rd Adden., 72)("However, 
Lakeland claims that Hartford breached the insurance policy by failing to provide an additional 
3 months of Business Income payments. Lakeland claims that it was not in a position to reopen 
in any capacity after the 9 months identified by Hartford based upon a cash-flow argument."). 
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b. Lakeland's objection to the Special Verdict forms is unfounded. 
During deliberations, the jury submitted a written question, which asked: "In reference 
to question #1 [on the Special Verdict Form] we want to know the actual language of the policy 
in regard to 'was Lakeland capable' or 'should have been capable' to resume some of its 
operations by November I, 2008?" (R., 2953.) The District Court conferred with the parties' 
counsel, and Lakeland's counsel recommended revision of the Special Verdict form. (Tr. II, 11. 
937:14-17)("MR. BISTLINE: I think the special verdict form needs to be redone and given 
back to them, and if not, then you need to say the period of restoration is what you must 
determine if they complied with."). The parties and District Court then agreed upon a revision: 
THE COURT: All right. Question number one would read, "Did The Hartford 
correctly determine the end date period of restoration," question mark. "Yes" or 
"no". Question number two: "Did Lakeland fail to provide Hartford with 
information and documentation in support of its claim in accordance with the 
terms of the policy which resulted in Hartford being unable to correctly calculate 
the period of restoration?" 
MS. DUKE: Okay. That's fine. 
THE COURT: Question mark. "Yes" or "no". Do you agree, Mr. Bistline? 
MR. BISTLINE: Yes, Your Honor. 
(944:25-945:11)(emphasis added). The revised Special Verdict was then read. (946:12-24.) 
With respect to the first Special Verdict that was read and provided to, but not used by, 
the jury given the above-described question and change to Question No.1, Lakeland has no 
ground to complain of error, as it was not the form used by the jury to render the verdict. "An 
error in the jury instructions that does not affect a substantial right of a party is disregarded as 
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harmless error." Weinstein v. Prudential Ins., 149 Idaho 299, 233 P.3d 1221, 1235 (2010). 
With respect to the revised Special Verdict, given that Lakeland did not object to the 
change to Question No.1, it cannot do so now because it has waived its right to object. See, 
e.g., Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 245 P.3d 992, 1003 (2010)("All 
parties assented to the change. Appellants do not point to any place in the record showing that 
they objected to the special verdict form after it was redrafted in final form by the district court. 
Therefore, we will not address the issue on appeal."). 
In summary, here, Lakeland 1) requested a revised Special Verdict form, 2) agreed to 
the revised Special Verdict, and 3) now appeals, asserting the language of the Special Verdict is 
defective. This is patently an untenable issue on appeal, and should be rejected by this Court. 
2. There was no error in the giving ofInstruction No. 12. 
Lakeland also asserts error in the giving of Instruction No. 12, the 'burden of proof 
instruction regarding Lakeland's breach of contract claim. (R. 3rd Adden., 409-10.) 
Specifically, Lakeland contends that it did not have the burden of proof in establishing the 
Period of Restoration, and that Hartford had the burden of proof in establishing the Period of 
Restoration as a 'condition subsequent.' (Appellant's Brief at 12.) Lakeland objected to 
Hartford's proposed Jury Instruction No. 19 (which later became Jury Instruction No. 12), 
making such 'condition subsequent' argument. (R. 3rd Adden., 46-47.) Following opposition 
briefing by Hartford (R. 2nd Adden., 422-23), the District Court rejected Lakeland's argument at 
jury instruction conference. (Tr. II, 507:21-508:3.) 
Lakeland seeks to relieve itself of any burden in the action by impermissibly shifting the 
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burden of proof to Hartford. In a breach of contract action, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
proving what provision of a contract is breached, and what damages it claims to have suffered -
a point recognized in Lakeland's own Proposed Instruction No.1: "The plaintiff has the burden 
of proving each of the following propositions .... " (R. 3rd Adden., at 10)(emphasis added). 
Lakeland's reliance on Bennett v. New York Life Ins. Co., 121 P.2d 551, 554 (1942) IS 
nonsensical. The quote cited by Lakeland - '''The condition of the policy in respect to giving 
notice of permanent disability as well as making proof of death operates upon the contract 
subsequent to the fact of loss." - is actually a quote from a 1927 Arkansas case, Pfeiffer v. 
Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 174 Ark. 783,297 S.W. 847 (Ark. 1927), which the Court was 
citing in discussion of various jurisdictions' treatment of question of compliance with policy 
terms. This Court expressly rejected the Arkansas position, instead holding that compliance 
with notice requirements was a condition precedent, emphasizing the contractual responsibilities 
of the insured. Id at 558. Further, Bennett does not address burdens of proof at trial. 
Accordingly, the District Court rightly placed no weight on Lakeland's citation to Bennett, nor 
Lakeland's related citation to Peterson v. Universal Automobile Ins. Co., 53 Idaho II, 20 P.2d 
1016 (1933), which only posits the condition subsequent analysis as relating to the purchase of 
an automobile, rather than a question of duty provisions in an insurance policy. 
Thus, Lakeland cites no authority for the proposition that Hartford bears the burden of 
proof regarding the identified Period of Restoration. Instead, Lakeland's burden of proof was to 
demonstrate that there was a specific provision of the policy that assured it of a specific 
payment, which Hartford otherwise did not make, resulting in a breach of contract. Indeed, the 
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District Court was precluded from giving an instruction that would have relieved Lakeland of 
its burden of proof. See, e.g., Robinson v. State Farm, 137 Idaho 173, 178,45 P.3d 829, 834 
(2002)("Robinson was excused from proving an essential element of the bad faith claim as that 
claim has been defined by this Court since White v. Unigard in 1986. That is not harmless 
error. "). As such, Lakeland has failed to "clearly show prejudicial error from an erroneous jury 
instruction," and Lakeland's assertion of error in the giving of Instruction No. 12 should be 
rejected by this Court. Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 543, 164 P.3d 819, 823 (2007). 
3. There was no error in Instruction No. 13 or Special Verdict Question No.4. 
The instructions and special verdict given to the jury included an instruction and 
question related to mitigation. Jury Instruction No. 13 (a slightly revised IDJI2d 9.14) stated 
that: "A person or corporation who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize 
the damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such 
care cannot be recovered." (R. 3rd Adden., 85.) In turn, Question No.4 of the final Special 
Verdict asked: "As to Business Personal Property coverage, did Lakeland fail to prevent or 
avoid any of its damages it claims?" (R. 3rd Adden., 97.) 
Even if Lakeland preserved error by objection (which it did not), such error would be 
harmless because the jury never reached the question of damages, instead finding for Hartford 
on the question of liability. See Schmechle v. Dille, 148 Idaho at 187 (finding that the admission 
of an expert's testimony regarding causation would only be relevant if plaintiffs proved that 
defendants had breached the applicable standard of health care practice; since it did not, any 
error was harmless); Finck v. Hoskins, 94 Idaho 524, 526, 492 P.2d 936,938 (1972)(stating that 
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"[sJince the jury found unanimously for respondent, it appears, in the absence of any contrary 
showing by appellants, that the instruction was of no prejudicial effect."). 
Second, Lakeland did not preserve the objection it is making to this instruction and the 
language of the Special Verdict at the time of the underlying proceedings. (Tr. II, 706:22-
716:16.) At the time, Lakeland's counsel's sole objection to the formulated instruction was that 
it was not asserting a Business Property claim. (715:22-16:14.) No other objection was 
subsequently made to Special Verdict Question No. 4 (or to the related Instruction No. 12) prior 
to the jury being read the jury instructions (868:23-869:21), nor during the re-drafting of the 
Special Verdict form. (936:8-945: 18.) Lakeland cannot now assert error on a different theory. 
Nevertheless, Lakeland now asserts that the instruction improperly went to mitigation of 
the Business Income claim; however, by the plain language of the Special Verdict question, the 
question of mitigation was directed to the question of Business Personal Property coverage. In 
fact, the District Court refused to allow the Special Verdict question to relate to Business 
Income to avoid a double-reduction. (Tr. II, 11. 709: 11-22; 710:20-711 :22.) Thus, no error lies 
in the District Court's giving ofInstruction No. 13 and Special Verdict Question No.4. 
D. There is no error in the District Court's summary judgment decision. 
Lakeland also asserts that the District Court erred in dismissing its bad faith claim prior 
to trial but its arguments on appeal are no more availing than they were at the District Court 
level, and the District Court's decision should be affirmed. 
1. Bad faith, generally, and the District Court's summary judgment rulings. 
To support a claim of bad faith under Idaho law, the insured must show: "(1) that 
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coverage of [the] claim, was not fairly debatable; (2) that [the insured] had proven coverage to 
the point that based on the evidence the insurer had before it, the insurer intentionally and 
unreasonably withheld [the insured's] benefits; (3) that the delay in payment was not the result 
of a good faith mistake; and (4) that the resulting harm was not fully compensable by contract 
damages." Robinson, 137 Idaho at 178. 
As outlined above, the District Court granted summary judgment on Lakeland's bad 
faith claim and thereafter denied Lakeland's subsequent multiple motions for reconsideration. 
In initially granting summary judgment, the District Court held that: "[W]hile I agree that there 
are no extra contractual damages that have been set forth given my ruling as to who the party is 
here in this case and that's the L.L.C., the primary reason for my decision as to dismissing all 
bad faith claims is the lack of proof that this claim is not fairly debatable." (Tr. I, 11.52:17-22.) 
Lakeland's first motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied, with the District Court 
noting: "The four elements - summary judgment could be granted on anyone of them being 
lacking .... The Plaintiff hasn't proven that the claim wasn't fairly debatable." (Tr. III, 11. 27:6-
7, 29: 10-11.) Lakeland's second motion for reconsideration similarly failed: "There has been 
nothing said today that alters my decision as to the lack of proof at the summary judgment 
juncture on the bad faith case, bad faith claim." (Tr. II, 11. 136:19-24.) Lakeland's third and 
final motion for reconsideration on the bad faith claim was also denied (R., 2319-27), with the 
District Court again emphasizing the lack of evidence put forth by Lakeland: "At summary 
judgment on Lakeland's bad faith claim, fault upon Lakeland is wholly irrelevant. However, 
proving the claim was not fairly debatable and proving coverage to the point that based on the 
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evidence before the insurer, the insurer then intentionally and unreasonably withheld benefits is 
not only relevant, it is dispositive, and, most importantly, it is Lakeland's burden to prove at 
summary judgment.' (R., 2322)(emphasis in original). 
As discussed herein, Lakeland cannot demonstrate that it sufficiently satisfied its 
requirement on summary judgment to adduce evidence in support of its bad faith claim, or even 
any of the elements of bad faith individually. For this reason, the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment to Hartford as to Lakeland's bad faith claim should be affirmed. 
2. The District Court did not err in finding Lakeland's claim to be fairly debatable. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has previously rejected a bad faith claim where the insurer 
and the insured disputed the value of an insurance claim, but the insurer had otherwise acted 
reasonably in evaluating the insured's claim. Squire v. Exchange Ins. Co., 116 Idaho 251, 253, 
775 P.2d 143, 145 (Ct. App. 1989)("We observe that Exchange discharged its contractual 
obligations to Squire by promptly acknowledging, investigating, and paying-based upon a good 
faith evaluation-Squire's claim .... We further note that Squire's claims for his x-ray machine and 
business losses were "fairly debatable." Exchange properly conducted itself and adequately 
explained its position to Squire with respect to these claims. Squire has failed to explain how 
Exchange's conduct or position was unreasonable."); accord, Roper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 131 Idaho 459, 462, 958 P.2d 1145, 1148 (1998). 
With respect to its claims, Lakeland had duties under the Policy, including duties to 
provide "quantities, costs, values and amount of loss claimed," and to "resume part or all of 
your operations as quickly as possible," duties which the Fritzes acknowledged they owed. (R., 
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107; 396-397, ll. 123:4-126:17; 1523-24, II. 18:15-22:17.) Hartford's calculations were based 
upon documentation and information provided to it by Lakeland. (see, e.g., R. 67-68, ~~2 & 7; 
315-329; 341-58.) Unfortunately, the record is replete with examples of Lakeland's conflicting 
claim demands both before and after suit was filed, which are outlined as follows: 
1st Claim 2na Claim 3f<l Claim 4th Claim Paid by 
(pre-suit)8 (post-suit)9 (post-suit) 10 (plaintiff s Hartford 12 
expert)ll 
Business $417,654.80 $lO6,530.00 $411,408.00 $261,397.00 $266,407.00 
Income 
Business 
--
$471,000.00 $170,053.78 $230,180.25 $386,650.25 
Personal 
Property 
Total $417,654.80 $577,000.00 $581,461.78 $491,559.25 $653,057.25 
As noted by Hartford in its summary judgment briefing, each of these calculations was replete 
with a lack of documentation and/or math errors, a problem borne out by the lack of consistency 
in the calculated amounts. 13 (R., 59-63.) Thus, the record amply demonstrates the ever-shifting 
8 Made July 8, 2008 (R., 299-302); see R. 59-60 (additional discussion of first claim problems). 
9 As discussed at the January 28,2009 deposition of Mr. Fritz (R., 1296, ll. 206:19-22; 1389); 
see R. 60-61 (additional discussion of second claim problems). 
10 As discussed at the January 28, 2009 deposition of Mr. Fritz (R., 1299, II. 219: 1-17; 1390); 
see R. 61 (additional discussion of third claim problems). 
II Presented prior to Hartford's summary judgment filing (R., 1490-1516.); see R. 61-63 
(additional discussion of fourth claim problems). 
12 Prior to suit and the first claim demand, Hartford had paid Lakeland $204,095.00 (R., 67.) 
Further, by the time of the Fritzes' depositions and the second and third demands, Hartford had 
paid Lakeland $258,323.44. (/d.) Finally, by the time of summary judgment and the fourth 
demand, Hartford had paid Lakeland $564,909.29. (/d.) 
13 Lakeland's assertion on appeal that Hartford's "accountants and Lakeland's accountants had 
calculated almost the same number" as demonstrating that the claim was fairly debatable is 
nonsensical. Lakeland is referencing the fourth claim amount (rendered long after 
commencement of litigation), an amount which is less than what Hartford paid. Lakeland offers 
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sands of Lakeland's varied claim demands, which ranged from grossly exaggerated to amounts 
less than what Hartford had paid, and which were frequently poorly (if at all) documented. l4 
As such, in light of the patent "fairly debatable" nature of the claim, and Lakeland's 
burden of proof that the claim was not fairly debatable, see Robinson, 137 Idaho at 177 ("the 
insured has the burden of showing that the claim was not fairly debatable")( emphasis added), 
the District Court did not error in dismissing Lakeland's bad faith claim. 
3. The District Court did not err in finding no unreasonable delay by Hartford. 
Lakeland further asserts that the District Court erred in finding no delay of payment; in 
doing so, however, Lakeland errs in pre-supposing that any improper delay occurred and in 
contending that Hartford bore the burden of explaining the delay. Both are incorrect. 
The gist of Lakeland's argument - that it need only demonstrate a lapse of time between 
when it wanted payment and when it received payment - does not constitute "bad faith" delay. 
Rather, the second element of a bad faith claim makes clear that an insured must have "proven 
coverage to the point that based on the evidence the insurer had before it, the insurer 
intentionally and unreasonably withheld [the insured's] benefits." Robinson, 137 Idaho at 178 
no explanation as to how an overpayment by Hartford would give rise to a bad faith claim, and 
is further evidence of the futility and lack of necessity in the whole of Lakeland's suit. 
l4 Lakeland's reference to Ms. Kohler's trial testimony is a non-starter. (Appellant's Brief at 
20, citing Tr. II, II. 598: 12-599:3.) First, the testimony was not before the District Court at the 
summary jUdgment phase. Second, the testimony does not specifically address any particular 
figures or demand by Lakeland, only unspecified "schedules." Third, Ms. Kohler's reference to 
"reasonable" was as to her own figures. Fourth, Ms. Kohler testified that while Mr. Glenister 
provided information and documents as to the earlier part of the claim, additional needed 
information halted when Lakeland's counsel appeared. (Tr. II, 11. 601 :9-10; 647:8-658: 1.) 
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(emphasis added). That is to say, the delay has to occur after an insured had proven coverage 
and where such delay was "intentional" and "unreasonable." Id. Rather than address intentional 
or unreasonable, Lakeland simply asserts that a lapse of time constitutes "delay," with no proof, 
nor even a bare contention, that the delay followed Lakeland's having "proven coverage to the 
point that based on the evidence the insurer had before it, the insurer intentionally and 
unreasonably withheld [the insured's] benefits." Id. This issue has previously been addressed 
by the Court of Appeals in Greene v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 114 Idaho 63, 753 P.2d 274 (Ct. 
App. 1988), which involved a livestock claim. The Greene court rejected the bad faith claim: 
"Of course the mere failure to immediately settle what later proves to be a 
valid claim does not of itself establish 'bad faith.' ... An insurer does not act 
in bad faith when it challenges the validity of a 'fairly debatable' claim, or when 
its delay results from honest mistakes." 
Although the investigation consumed several months, and might well have been 
conducted more expeditiously, the record is devoid of any indication that the 
company intended to achieve delay for delay's sake. Rather, the record-
including extracts from the company's claim file-demonstrates beyond dispute 
that the company's representatives were concerned about the unique nature of the 
claim and about the sparseness of verifiable facts to support Greene's theory that 
a cougar attack produced his dairy herd's mastitis. 
114 Idaho at 67-68 (emphases added)(internal citations omitted). 
Lakeland baldly asserts that "Hartford not only had everything it needed to determine 
the business income claim, ... it did determine that claim and then just refused to pay it," 
pointing vaguely to its "facts" earlier set forth. (Appellant's Brief at 19.) Lakeland also 
suggests that Hartford did not identify what information was needed. (/d. at 18.) However, 
Lakeland's "facts" are woefully incorrect, and ignores how the claim actually proceeded. 
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As to the first point (that Hartford had all needed information), a correct reading of the 
record demonstrates that Hartford, through Ms. Kale, Mr. Bonanno (of GAB Robins), and Don 
Morandini (of Cargo Liquidators), requested on mUltiple occasions that Lakeland provide 
inventory information in support of its Business Personal Property claim, which was not 
provided prior to the filing of Lakeland's suit. (R., 194, 279-80, 288-89, 295-97, 302, 304-06, 
311.) Additionally, Hartford, through Ms. Kale and Ms. Kohler, requested additional business 
income data on multiple occasions, which was not provided prior to the filing of Lakeland's 
suit. (R., 237-38, 241, 252, & 307-08.) On November 22, 2008, after Lakeland filed suit 
against Hartford, Lakeland's counsel finally produced a copy of the 874-page inventory list via 
email, which took only approximately three to four hours to create. (R.,404-1278.) Thereafter, 
after additional requests and coordination, an inspection of the stored inventory was made and 
additional inventory-related information was provided by Lakeland during the March-May 2009 
timeframe. (R., 68, 330-58, & 1279-1416.) Additional Business Income claim documents were 
forwarded to Hartford's counsel by Lakeland's counsel on October 27, 2008, February 5,2009, 
February 9,2009, February 15,2009, February 24,2009, February 25,2009, and April 9, 2009. 
(R., 1417-82.) Thus, the record amply demonstrates that Hartford consistently and repeatedly 
requested information needed for processing of the claim, even after suit was filed. (R., 36-45; 
51-57.) When information was provided, the applicable claim amounts were paid. (R., 67.) 
As to the second point (that Hartford never specified what information it needed), the 
record is again replete with information contradicting this unfounded assertion. Lakeland 
deposed Ms. Kohler, which deposition included, as exhibits, letters from Ms. Kohler to Mr. 
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Fritz (one of plaintiffs owners) and Mr. Van Valin (plaintiffs attorney, for a time) requesting 
specific documents in support of the claim. (R., at 2259-60.) Hartford's summary judgment 
motion also identified the kind of information requested (and not provided) by plaintiff, 
including contact with plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Bistline, outlining the documents needed. (R., 
237-38 (July 30, 2008 email).) Other entries also reflect specific document requests. (R., 240-
41 (July 31, 2008 email from Ms. Kohler to Mr. Bistline); R., 246-47 (Aug. 18, 2008 email 
from Ms. Kohler to Mr. Bistline); see also R., 1571-72 (Nov. 20, 2008 letter from Mr. Bistline 
to Hartford's counsel).) Thus, not only does the record eviscerate this contention, but Lakeland 
also fails to make any effort to address or rebut the District Court's analysis and rejection of this 
same argument in the fourth motion for reconsideration. (R., 2326.} 
Finally, Lakeland's claim that the District Court found Lakeland at "fault" for the delay 
IS unfounded. The District Court explained, in ruling on Lakeland's fourth motion for 
reconsideration: "At summary judgment on Lakeland's bad faith claim,fault upon Lakeland is 
wholly irrelevant. However, proving the claim was not fairly debatable and proving coverage 
to the point that based on the evidence before the insurer, the insurer then intentionally and 
unreasonably withheld benefits is not only relevant, it is dispositive, and, most importantly, it is 
Lakeland's burden to prove at summary judgment.' (R., 2322)(original emphases.) 
Thus, the District Court correctly held that Lakeland failed to sufficiently demonstrate 
that it had proven coverage to the point that based on the evidence before Hartford, Hartford 
then intentionally and unreasonably withheld benefits, so as to survive summary judgment. 
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4. The District Court did not err in finding Lakeland had not demonstrated a lack of 
good faith mistake by Hartford. 
Lakeland next contends, in a mere three sentences, that there was no "good faith 
mistake" in Hartford's actions, yet making no specific citation to the record in support of such 
contention. Lakeland's argument misconstrues the element at issue and its evidentiary burden. 
First, Lakeland misapprehends the actual element. Lakeland has the burden of proving 
that "the delay in payment was not the result of a good faith mistake." Lakeland cannot simply 
point to the requests for information (upon which both the Business Personal Property and 
Business Income claims hinged), and assert that no good faith mistake existed. Rather, 
Lakeland must demonstrate how the making of such requests - if the requests themselves were 
improper - were not made as the result of, e.g., a mistaken interpretation of the requirements of 
the Policy. However here, as in Greene, supra, "the record is devoid of any indication that the 
company intended to achieve delay for delay's sake." 
As to the two vaguely-defined issues Lakeland points to, both are belied by the record 
itself. As detailed above, Hartford, pre-suit, repeatedly sought production of a store inventory 
list to document the Business Personal Property claim and verification of expenditures and 
payroll, requested on multiple occasions that Lakeland provide inventory information in support 
of its Business Personal Property claim, and requested action on the salvage of the surviving 
inventory on multiple occasions. No inventory report was provided until two months after suit, 
at which time the inventory process commenced and was ultimately evaluated and paid by 
Hartford. (R., 67.) Indeed, Lakeland itself made no attempt to inventory the stored stock and 
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fixtures in the interim. (R. Adden., 2.) Additionally, Hartford, through Ms. Kale and Ms. 
Kohler, requested additional Business Income data on mUltiple occasions, which was not 
provided prior to Lakeland filing suit. When information was ultimately collected, Hartford 
analyzed the information presented, and made Business Income payments. (R., 67.) 
Even if Hartford's requests were somehow in error, Lakeland must still adduce evidence 
in opposing summary judgment that such requests were not a good faith mistake. Lakeland 
offers no evidence, either before the District Court or on appeal, to demonstrate that Hartford 
"intended to achieve delay for delay's sake." As such, the District Court correctly held that 
"Lakeland did not prove [this] element[] at summary judgment and has failed to do so on 
reconsideration" (R., 2327), and correctly granted Hartford summary judgment. 
5. The District Court did not err in finding Lakeland failed to demonstrate extra-
contractual damages. 
Finally, Lakeland contends that the District Court should have found that it had damages 
not recoverable in contract, the fourth element of a bad faith claim. Lakeland points to a 
handful of items, none of which demonstrate that the District Court erred. 
First, Lakeland points to its contention that "Lakeland's standing with True Value was at 
risk" and that Lakeland "had lost all ability to finance its inventory through True Value[.]" 
(Appellant's Brief, at 21.) Lakeland apparently bases this on paragraphs 8-10 of the Fritz 
affidavit, which discusses Lakeland's failure to make inventory payments, such that True Value 
had demanded $69,699.63 and that "[t]his placed my status with True Value at risk." (R., 
1738.) The affidavit is devoid of any contention that Lakeland had "lost all ability to finance its 
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inventory through True Value," and moreover, the affidavit offers nothing in support of the bare 
contention that its standing was "at risk," nor quantifies damages. 
Second, Lakeland points to trial testimony to contend that Lakeland "was behind with 
other creditors who financed its inventory." (Appellant's Brief at 22.) Any such evidence was 
obviously not before the District Court during summary judgment and as such, offers nothing 
by way of contending the District Court's summary judgment decision was in error. 15 
Finally, Lakeland confusingly claims that because the Policy did not provide Business 
Income coverage until when the store reopened (in August 2009), its expert's "underfunding" 
analysis for the time period of January 28, 2009 through December 31, 2009 should be 
considered. Lakeland did not argue to the District Court that this figure, or any component of it, 
constituted extracontractual damages. This information, even had it been argued to the District 
Court, would not establish the claimed extracontractual damages for the pre-opening period, as 
it is instead, calculated through the end of 2009, a date after the store was open. Moreover, Mr. 
Harper's opinions were challenged and limited on a number of grounds, and other grounds were 
deferred, including Hartford's Rule 7021Daubert challenge. (R.,2211-14.) Lakeland has made 
no challenge as to the District Court's rulings regarding Mr. Harper, and cannot establish that 
Mr. Harper's testimony would have even ultimately been admissible at trial. Vanderford Co. v. 
15 During summary judgment, Lakeland pointed to a number of damages that were either 
personal to the Fritzes or undocumented. (R. Adden., 16-21.) On reconsideration, Lakeland 
offered a new battery of damages, which were either contractual in nature or were otherwise 
inadmissible. (R., 1802-05.) On its second reconsideration, Lakeland did not address 
extracontractual damages. (R. Adden., 360; Tr. II, II. 63:22-64:8.) Lakeland's third 
reconsideration also did not address the subject. (R., 2218-19. ) Finally, Lakeland's fourth 
reconsideration failed to identify any admissible extracontractual damages. (R.,2302.) 
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Knudson, 249 P.3d 835, 865,2011 WL 941463 (Idaho 2011)("The evidence offered in support 
of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be admissible."). 
Accordingly, for this reason, and in light of Lakeland's failure to sufficiently 
demonstrate the other elements of bad faith, Lakeland cannot demonstrate its bad faith claim 
should have survived summary judgment, and the District Court's decision should be affirmed. 
E. Lakeland is not entitled to more than 12 months of Business Interruption coverage. 
Lakeland also asserts that the District Court erred in limiting Lakeland's breach of 
contract claim to "the remaining three months of the 12 month limitation on payment of lost 
business income" (Appellant's Brief at 22), requesting that this Court, should it remand, direct 
the District Court to allow Lakeland's claim for consequential damages. Consequential 
damages are not allowed under the contract based on the Policy's Business Income limitation, 
which is limited to a maximum of 12 months, and also specifically provides that, with respect to 
Business Income, "[w]e will not pay for ... [a]ny other consequential loss." (R., 97 & 105.) 
Further, the Policy specifically provides for a 3-person 'appraisal' procedure, in the event that 
Hartford and the insured disagree on the amount of the loss. (R. 107.) 
Based upon these provisions, Hartford moved to limit the damages potentially 
recoverable by Lakeland to only Business Income amounts for the time period from November 
1, 2008 to January 28, 2009. (R., 2019-64, 2082-2107; R. Adden., 265-353.) The District 
Court granted such relief by way of a detailed memorandum decision issued March 8, 2010. (R., 
2183-2215.) The District Court's thorough analysis concluded with a determination that 
consequential damages were not recoverable in this case because Lakeland did not allege and 
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offered no evidence that at the time of contracting, consequential damages of the type sought in 
this case were contemplated by the parties. (R., 2210-11.) 
Lakeland subsequently sought reconsideration on the grounds that the terms of the 
Policy were ambiguous (a new argument), which the District Court rejected, stating: 
"Lakeland's interpretation is but' ... a tortured construction of an insurance contract in order to 
create an ambiguity and thus provide an avenue for coverage where none exists.'" (R., 2238-
39)(quoting Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. ofIdaho, 143 Idaho 135, 139 P.3d 737 (2006». 
On appeal, Lakeland asserts in conclusory fashion that damages beyond the three-month 
period were "specifically within the contemplation of the parties," in that "it had to be within 
the contemplation of the parties that failing to timely investigate and pay the claim would cause 
the type of damages that it did[.]" (Appellants' Brief at 23.) However, as an initial matter, 
Lakeland's insistence that consequential damages "was at least an issue for the jury" is 
unfounded, given that the jury never reached the question of damages, instead ruling for 
Hartford on the issue of liability. See Schmechle v. Dille, 148 Idaho at 187; Finck v. Hoskins, 
94 Idaho at 526. Lakeland's own proposed Special Verdict form limited damages to the three-
month period at issue (R. 3rd Adden., 66) and Lakeland's counsel even advised the District 
Court during trial that: "My objection to the limitation of the damages for the three month 
period is withdrawn." (R. 4th Adden., 12.) Thus, Lakeland cannot assert error on this point. 
In any event, as to the 12-month provision at issue, Lakeland only cites a single bad 
faith decision from New York (Bi-Economy Market, Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of New York, 
886 N.E.2d 127 (N.Y. 2008», yet fails to explain how the District Court's evaluation of Bi-
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Economy was in error, and otherwise fails to discuss and analyze the other key decisions relied 
upon by the District Court in making its decision, including Blis Day Spa, LLC v. The Hartford 
Ins. Group, 427 F.Supp.2d 621 (W.D.N.C. 2006), Streamline Capital, LLC v. Hartford Cas. Ins. 
Co., 2003 WL 22004888 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), and Lava Trading Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 365 
F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). (See R. 2189-2211.) Lakeland also does not dispute the 
District Court's finding that "Lakeland has not alleged that Lakeland and Hartford contemplated 
consequential damages at the time their insurance contract was entered into." (R. 2210.) In 
fact, a plain reading of the Policy belies any such contention, given that the Policy expressly: 
limits Business Income coverage to 12 months; excludes payment for consequential damages; 
and includes an appraisal provision, all of which amply demonstrate that consequential damages 
were not contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting. (R., 95, 105, & 107.) 
Further, Lakeland fails to address, in any way, the appraisal provision discussed by the 
District Court in its decision. (R. 2198-2202, discussing Lava Trading, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 447-
48 ("The Policy sets forth an explicit dispute resolution mechanism, to be conducted by an 
appraiser, that either party may invoke in the event of any disagreement as to the amount of 
loss."»; see also Blis, 427 F.Supp.2d at 640 ("Having considered the entirety of the Business 
Policy, the Court concludes that the parties knew that Hartford disclaimed business interruption 
coverage for consequential losses, and that in the event of a disagreement, either party could 
seek appraisaL"». Lakeland's failure to address this evaluation and consideration by the 
District Court is punctuated by the fact that Lakeland can point to nothing in the record that 
indicates that an appraisal request was made during the course of the claim (or even afterward). 
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The District Court's ruling should be affirmed. 
As a final note, Lakeland's argument pre-supposes admissibility of any evidence in 
support of a consequential damages claim. The various components of consequential damages 
(R. at 2187-88) were dealt with summarily in the District Court's ruling; however, the District 
Court deferred ruling on Hartford's Rule 7021Daubert challenges until the time of trial, which 
included challenges to Mr. Harper's calculations of amounts beyond the scope of the three-
month Business Income limitation. (R., 2211-14; R. Adden., 112-121 Thus, even if remanded, 
an order directing admission of any such evidence would be premature, and would deprive the 
District Court of testing any such evidence before permitting it to be presented to a jury. 
F. The District Court did not err in awarding discretionary costs after judgment. 
Hartford filed its motion and memorandum of costs, requesting $15,256.08 in costs as a 
matter of right, and $72,126.57 in discretionary costs, both under LR.C.P. 54(d)(I) and 68. (R., 
2623-2923.) Of these requested amounts, the District Court awarded Hartford $15,256.08 in 
costs as a matter of right and $56,574.69 in discretionary costs, for a total cost award of 
$71,830.77. 16 (R.,941-43.) The Court's decision should be affirmed. 
1. Lakeland has waived any obiection to the discretionary cost award in light of its 
untimely opposition. 
On June 11,2010, Hartford filed Defendant's Motion for Award of Costs, as well as its 
supporting memorandum and affidavits. (R., 2623-2923.) These documents were received by 
Lakeland's counsel's office on June 11,2010. (R. 2nd Adden., 433-34.) Lakeland then had 14 
16 Lakeland does not challenge the District Court's award of costs-by-right on appeal. 
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days to file an opposition, or otherwise waive such: "Failure to timely object to the items in the 
memorandum of costs shall constitute a waiver of all objections to the costs claimed." LR.C.P. 
54(d)(6); Conner v. Dake, 103 Idaho 761, 761, 653 P.2d 1173, 1173 (1982). Thus, any 
objection by Lakeland was due no later than June 25, 2010. Lakeland did not file Plaintiff's 
Sworn Objection to Defendant's Memorandum of Costs until June 28,2010. (R., 2930.) 
At hearing, the District Court held that Lakeland's opposition was untimely, but still 
undertook analysis of the cost claim. (Tr. II, 11. 976:24-977:4); see Long v. Hendricks, 114 
Idaho 157, 162, 754 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Ct. App. 1988)("Lack of a timely objection precludes a 
party against whom fees are awarded from challenging the award on appeal. However, it does 
not preclude the court from exercising its discretion in deciding whether to make an award."). 
The District Court's ruling on the untimeliness of Lakeland's objection is not challenged on 
appeal, and the District Court's award of$56,574.69 in discretionary costs should be affirmed. 
2. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding discretionary costs. 
Even were the discretionary cost award subject to appellate review, the record reflects 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in making such award and in fact, rejected some of 
Hartford's requested discretionary costs. (984:6-985:14.) There are a number of examples of 
this Court awarding discretionary costs to the prevailing party. Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 
161, 158 P.3d 937 (2007); Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp." 136 Idaho 
466,474-75,36 P.3d 218,226-27; Wooley Trust v. Debest Plumbing, 133 Idaho 180, 186-187, 
983 P.2d 834, 840-841 (1999). Lakeland's reliance on Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 960 P.2d 
175 (1998) fails to recognize that the suggested interpretation - that certain categories of costs 
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can never be claimed as they are "common" to litigation - has been rejected by the Wooley 
Trust court. 133 Idaho at 186-187. 
It is clear that the discretionary costs awarded were necessarily and reasonably incurred 
in light of the claims advanced by Lakeland, given the overall complexity and nature of the 
case, as highlighted by the District Court at hearing. (Tr. II, 11. 978: 14-18 & 980:21-
24)(discussing Beale v. Speck, 127 Idaho 521, 903 P.2d 110 (CL App. 1995)). The District 
Court correctly emphasized the following: Lakeland filed suit prematurely (R., 404-1278; Tr. I, 
11. 366:8-21; 369: 3-4; 433:2-5); Lakeland's bad faith claim was untenable (Tr. II, 979:14-17); 
Lakeland failed to provide cancelled checks (Tr. II, 11. 981 :22-24); Lakeland filed unnecessary 
motions to reconsider (Tr. II, 982:9-13; R. 2326-27); and Lakeland engaged in sloppy 
accounting and inconsistent demands (Tr. II, 11. 983 :5-15). All of these factors - for a trial over 
$19,052 (after $746,979.25 in claim payments) for which the jury was out for a total of 71 
minutes (Tr. II, 11. 926:4:8 & 948:20) were appropriately considered by the District Court in 
finding Hartford's costs were necessary and reasonably incurred in light of Lakeland's claims 
given the exceptional nature of the case. The District Court's award of discretionary costs 
should be affirmed. 
G. Lakeland's proposed expert, Mr. Underdown, was properly stricken. 
Lakeland argues that there was no finding that Underdown's expert report was untimely, 
and the later ruling to strike the Underdown affidavit was in error. Lakeland's argument is 
groundless because Lakeland failed to timely disclose Underdown and agreed to withdraw him 
as an expert in the case. In any event, the exclusion of a bad faith witness in this matter is 
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otherwise harmless, as the District Court did not err in dismissing Lakeland's bad faith claim, 
and the allowance of bad faith testimony, absent a bad faith claim, would have itself been error. 
The District Court's Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Initial Pretrial Order 
dated June 22, 2009, stated that "[n]ot later than one hundred eighty (180) days before trial, 
plaintiff(s) shall disclose all experts to be called at trial." (R. 4th Adden., 16-17.) On September 
23,2009, its deadline, Lakeland filed Plaintiffs Expert Witness Disclosure, which did not name 
Mr. Underdown, but instead named another expert, Drew Lucurell. (R. 3rd Adden., 1-3.) Just 3 
days before Hartford's own expert disclosure deadline, Lakeland served supplemental discovery 
responses purporting to identifY Mr. Underdown as an expert. (R. 2nd Adden., 60-71.) 
Hartford moved to strike the disclosure of Mr. Underdown because his testimony was 
untimely and irrelevant in light of the Court's grant of summary judgment against Lakeland's 
bad faith claim. (R. Adden, 31-108.) Hearing was held on January 13, 2010, in conjunction 
with one of Lakeland's motions to reconsider the summary judgment decision. (Tr. III, 11. 4:5-
23.) The Court denied Lakeland's motion for reconsideration, and then struck plaintiff's 
designation of Underdown and Lucurell noting that Lakeland agreed to striking Mr. Underdown 
if the reconsideration motion was denied. (Tr. 111,11.31 :4-21; R., 1894-95.)17 
Lakeland subsequently moved to amend its complaint to include a punitive damages 
claim, and in support submitted an affidavit from Mr. Underdown. (R. 2nd Adden., 177-207.) 
17 Following its supplemental disclosure, Lakeland filed its Motion for Relief from Pretrial 
Order on November 16, 2009, arguing that the Underdown designation should be allowed based 
upon the contention that Hartford had suffered no prejudice. (R. 3rd Adden., 4-5 & R.,1763-66; 
opposed by R. 4th Adden., 1-11.» At the same argument on January 13, 2010, Lakeland's 
counsel conceded that such motion was moot. (Tr. 111,11. 33:24-34:2.) 
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Hartford moved to strike the affidavit on a number of grounds, including the irrelevancy of the 
testimony in light of the District Court's summary judgment ruling and the striking of the 
designation of Mr. Underdown. (R. 2nd Adden., 177-182.) At argument on February 22, 20lO, 
Lakeland again agreed to the motion to strike and the District Court then granted the motion to 
strike. (Tr. I, 11. 89:12-24; 90:4 & 138:1:13; R., 2114-15)(emphasis added)Y Lakeland cannot 
now assert error. Mackowiak v. Harris, 146 Idaho 864, 866-67, 204 P.3d 504, 506-07 
(2009)(holding that a party's failure to object to action by the trial court precludes a party from 
challenging that action on appeal). 
Moreover, even were there error by the Court regarding the striking ofMr. Underdown's 
affidavit, the context must be considered. Mr. Underdown's affidavit was submitted in 
cOrUunction with a motion to amend to add a claim for punitive damages, which was denied by 
the District Court (the denial of which is not on appeal). (Tr. I,ll. 137:2-25.) 
For these reasons, Lakeland's demand that this Court "instruct the Trial Court to allow 
the testimony of Underdown" is unfounded. The District Court's striking of Mr. Underdown's 
designation and affidavit should be affirmed, and this Court should not otherwise mandate the 
District Court automatically admit Mr. Underdown's testimony in the event of remand. 
H. Lakeland is not entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal. 
Lakeland also requests attorney's fees on appeal, pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839. Lakeland's 
18 Lakeland also identified Mr. Underdown as a trial witness, which was the subject of a motion 
in limine by Hartford, which is not an issue on appeal. At hearing, Lakeland again agreed to 
withdraw the testimony: "They do not want Mr. Underdown to testify. Obviously I have no 
objection based on the current rulings of the Court." (Tr. I,ll. 238:21-23)(emphasis added). 
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requested relief - a reversal of pre-trial decisions by the District Court and the jury verdict -
expressly contemplates a remand to the District Court for further pre-trial proceedings and, 
ultimately, another jury trial. As such, Lakeland is not entitled to fees should it prevail on 
appeal. See, e.g., Hill v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 249 P.3d 812, 824, 2011 WL 13900 
(Idaho 2011) (explaining that "[i]fHiIl prevails on appeal, she has only succeeded in having the 
summary judgment against her vacated. Although the exhaustion clause would not bar her 
recovery, under I.C. § 41-1839(1) she still must establish the 'amount justly due under [her] 
policy,' if any. She therefore shall not receive attorney fees on appeal."). 
Moreover, as discussed above, no error lies in the decisions of the District Court or the 
jury in this matter. Accordingly, Lakeland has no basis to request an award of fees on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code §41-1839 and, as such, Lakeland's request should be denied. Lovey v. 
Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 139 Idaho 37, 49, 72 P.3d 877, 889 (2003)("Because [the 
insured] did not prevail on the appeal, she is not entitled to an award under [I.e. §41-1839]."). 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the decisions of the District Court and the verdict of the 
jury should be affirmed, and Hartford should be awarded its costs on appeaL 
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